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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Logic and Computation Année : 2021

Games of Influence

Résumé

In this paper, we present two models for reasoning about strategic actions in opinion diffusion. In both models, the agents are endowed with goals expressed compactly in a suitably defined language of linear temporal logic and are connected in an influence network which defines the underlying opinion diffusion process. The agents can act by exerting their influence or retain from it: in one case, we assume an initial state of incomplete information about the agents’ opinions, while in the other, we assume that the agents have complete information. We investigate the interplay between simple network structures (e.g. certain acyclic graphs) and the existence of game-theoretic solution concepts for the unanimity aggregator. We also give bounds for the computational complexity of strategic reasoning in both our models on arbitrary networks.
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Dates et versions

hal-03117720 , version 1 (21-01-2021)

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Umberto Grandi, Emiliano Lorini, Arianna Novaro, Laurent Perrussel. Games of Influence. Journal of Logic and Computation, 2021, exaa088, pp.1-29. ⟨10.1093/logcom/exaa088⟩. ⟨hal-03117720⟩
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