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Econometrics of scoring auctions

Abstract : This chapter develops a structural framework for the analysis of scoring procurement auctions where bidder’s quality and bid are taken into account. With exogenous quality, the authors characterize the optimal mechanism whether the buyer is private or public and show that the optimal scoring rule need not be linear in the bid. The model primitives include the buyer benefit function, the bidders’ cost inefficiencies distribution and cost function, and potentially the cost of public funds. We show that the model primitives are nonparametrically identified under mild functional assumptions from the buyer’s choice, firms’ bids and qualities. The authors then develop a multistep kernel-based procedure to estimate the model primitives and provide their convergence rates. Our identification and estimation results are general as they apply to other scoring rules including quasi-linear ones.
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https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02536354
Contributor : Isabelle Perez Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, April 8, 2020 - 9:41:35 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, June 9, 2021 - 10:00:16 AM

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Jean-Jacques Laffont, Isabelle Perrigne, Michel Simioni, Quang Vuong. Econometrics of scoring auctions. Li, T.; Pesaran, M.; Terrel, D. Essays in honor of Cheng Hsiao, 41, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2020, Advances in Econometrics, 978-1-78973-958-9. ⟨10.1108/S0731-905320200000041010⟩. ⟨hal-02536354⟩

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