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Multi-party negotiation when agents have subjective estimates of bargaining powers

Abstract : This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.
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Submitted on : Friday, May 29, 2020 - 9:47:06 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, March 23, 2022 - 12:08:09 PM

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Nicolas Quérou, Patrick Rio, Mabel Tidball. Multi-party negotiation when agents have subjective estimates of bargaining powers. Group Decision and Negotiation, INFORMS, 2007, 16 (5), pp.417-436. ⟨10.1007/s10726-006-9058-2⟩. ⟨hal-02654717⟩

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