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Incentives to reduce crop trait durability

Abstract : To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period framework, we first investigate the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions. Second, we study how the introduction of a fee paid by self-producing farmers affects those decisions. We find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of a self-production fee improves efficiency.
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https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02662397
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Submitted on : Sunday, May 31, 2020 - 12:09:52 AM
Last modification on : Friday, November 6, 2020 - 4:42:44 AM

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Stefan Ambec, Corinne Langinier, Stephane Lemarié. Incentives to reduce crop trait durability. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2008, 90 (2), pp.379-391. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01110.x⟩. ⟨hal-02662397⟩

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