HAL will be down for maintenance from Friday, June 10 at 4pm through Monday, June 13 at 9am. More information
Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation

Abstract : We present a method for the derivation of feedback Nash equi- libria in discrete-time finite-horizon nonstationary dynamic games. A partic- ular motivation for such games stems from environmental economics, where problems of seasonal competition for water levels occur frequently among heterogeneous economic agents. These agents are coupled through a state variable, which is the water level. Actions are strategically chosen to max- imize the agents individual season-dependent utility functions. We observe that, although a feedback Nash equilibrium exists, it does not satisfy the (exogenous) environmental watchdog expectations. We devise an incentive scheme to help meeting those expectations and calculate a feedback Nash equilibrium for the new game that uses the scheme. This solution is more environmentally friendly than the previous one. The water allocation game solutions help us to draw some conclusions regarding the agents behavior and also about the existence of feedback Nash equilibria in dynamic games.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02663212
Contributor : Migration Prodinra Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Sunday, May 31, 2020 - 2:12:34 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, March 23, 2022 - 12:08:09 PM

Links full text

Identifiers

Citation

Jacek B Krawczyk, Mabel Tidball. A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer Verlag, 2006, 128 (2), pp.411-429. ⟨10.1007/s10957-006-9020-0⟩. ⟨hal-02663212⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

3