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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2012

How to play games? Nash versus berge behaviour rules

Résumé

Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.
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Dates et versions

hal-02749251 , version 1 (03-06-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02749251 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 370053

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Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdait. How to play games? Nash versus berge behaviour rules. 11 Journées Louis-André Gérard Varet, Jun 2012, Marseille, France. ⟨hal-02749251⟩
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