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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2011

Voting rules in bargaining with costly persistent recognition: a field experiment on motivational crowding-outta analysis

Résumé

In this paper, we consider a model of multilateral bargaining where homogeneous agents may exert effort before negotiations in order to influence their chances of becoming the proposer. Effort levels have a permanent effect on the recognition process (persistent recognition). We prove three main results. First, voting rules are equivalent (that is, they yield the same social cost) when recognition becomes persistent. Secondly, an equilibrium may fail to exist, because players may have more incentives to reduce their effort level (in order to be included in winning coalitions) than to increase it (in order to increase their proposal power). Thirdly, we prove that the existence problem is driven by the intensity of competition at the recognition stage. Another definition of this process enables to fix this problem.
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Dates et versions

hal-02810783 , version 1 (06-06-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02810783 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 41820

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Nicolas Quérou, Raphael Soubeyran. Voting rules in bargaining with costly persistent recognition: a field experiment on motivational crowding-outta analysis. 2011. ⟨hal-02810783⟩
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