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Credence goods, experts and risk aversion

Résumé : The existing literature in expert-customer relationship concludes that when: i) consumers are homogenous, ii) consumers are committed with an an expert once this one made a recommendation, and iii) the type of treatment provided is verifiable, an expert finds optimal to serve efficiently his customers. This work shows that the previous result may not occur when consumers are not risk-neutral. Our result, that holds in a monopoly setting and under Bertrand competition, suggests that risk averse consumers have more likely to be mistreated by experts.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02822445
Contributor : Migration Prodinra <>
Submitted on : Saturday, June 6, 2020 - 8:23:12 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 5, 2021 - 4:02:01 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02822445, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 36497

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Olivier Bonroy, Stephane Lemarié, Jean-Philippe Tropeano, . Umr Inra / Univ. Grenoble 2 : Economie Appliquée de Grenoble. Credence goods, experts and risk aversion. 2010. ⟨hal-02822445⟩

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