. L'indice-de-colomer and . Martinez-r-epartit-le-pouvoir,

, Soient deux joueurs i et j tels que w i w j . Consid erons une coalition S telle que S 2 D j . Si i 2 S, alors il est clair que S 2 D i . Supposons que l'on ait i = 2 S. Dans ce cas, la coalition S ; f jg + fig appartient a D i et le cardinal de S ; f jg + fig est egal a s. Autrement dit

, Si nous mesurons le pouvoir des individus a l'aide de l'indice de Colomer et Martinez, nous obtenons les r esultats suivants

, Lorsque le joueur 2 transf ere une partie de son poids au joueur 4, son pouvoir augmente. L'indice de Colomer et Martinez est donc

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