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## Forest Dieback, a Tangible Proof of Climate Change? A Cross-Comparison of Forest Stakeholders' Perceptions and Strategies in the Mountain Forests of Europe and China

Philippe Deuffic<sup>1</sup> · Mareike Garms<sup>2</sup> · Jun He<sup>3</sup> · Elodie Brahic<sup>1</sup> · Hua Yang<sup>1</sup> · Marius Mayer<sup>1,4</sup>

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### Abstract

Forest dieback due to climate change poses a risk to mountain forests throughout the world, and has severe consequences in terms of lost ecosystem services for forest stakeholders. This contribution aims to analyze how forest stakeholders perceive forest dieback, and the way in which they adapt to it. We conducted qualitative in-depth interviews in three mid-mountain case study areas in France, Germany, and China, enabling a cross-comparison of different settings affected by forest dieback. Results show that forest dieback is not a new phenomenon for stakeholders who consider that it has increased over the last few decades, due to rising temperatures and extreme weather events. In all survey areas, respondents consider forest dieback as tangible proof of climate change, identifying context-specific impacts with varying levels of severity. Cause-effect relationships are not easy to establish. Forest stakeholders are unable to determine whether climate change is a triggering or aggravating factor. For adaptive strategies, respondents can be grouped into three main profiles: proactive, reactive, and wait-and-see forest owners. These types of stakeholders differ in terms of their investment capacities, economic dependency, emotional attachment to forests, knowledge level, and capacity to obtain actionable information through participation in institutional networks.

**Keywords** Climate change · Forest dieback · Adaptation strategies · Forest stakeholders · Europe · China

## Forest dieback, a tangible proof of climate change? A cross-comparison of forest stakeholders' perceptions and strategies in the mountain forests of Europe and China

1. **Corresponding author** ; Philippe Deuffic, INRAE, ETBX, 50 avenue de Verdun Gazinet, F-33612 Cestas cedex, France, [philippe.deuffic@inrae.fr](mailto:philippe.deuffic@inrae.fr) tel :+33 557890838
2. Mareike Garms, Greifswald University, Institute of Geography and Geology, Friedrich-Ludwig-Jahn-Str. 17a, 17487 Greifswald, Germany, [mareike.garms@uni-greifswald.de](mailto:mareike.garms@uni-greifswald.de)
3. Jun He, School of Ethnology and Sociology, Yunnan University, 650092, Kunming, China, [jun.he@ynu.edu.cn](mailto:jun.he@ynu.edu.cn)
4. Elodie Brahic, INRAE, ETBX, 50 avenue de Verdun Gazinet, F-33612 Cestas cedex, France, [elodie.brahic@inrae.fr](mailto:elodie.brahic@inrae.fr)
5. Hua Yang, School of Ethnology and Sociology, Yunnan University, 650092, Kunming, China, [huayang@ynu.edu.cn](mailto:huayang@ynu.edu.cn)
6. Marius Mayer,
  - Innsbruck University, Department of Strategic Management, Marketing and Tourism (Team SME and Tourism), Faculty of Business and Management, Karl-Rahner-Platz 3, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria, [marius.mayer@uibk.ac.at](mailto:marius.mayer@uibk.ac.at)
  - Greifswald University, Institute of Geography and Geology, Friedrich-Ludwig-Jahn-Str. 17a, 17487 Greifswald, Germany

24

## 25 **Abstract**

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## 42 **Keywords**

43 Climate change, forest dieback, adaptation strategies, forest stakeholders, Europe, China

44

45

## 46 **1. Introduction**

47 Climate change significantly affects the ecological and economic viability of forests, and  
48 contributes to changes in tree species patterns around the world (IPCC 2014). Over the next  
49 few decades, tree dieback and mortality are projected to increase in many regions due to  
50 higher temperatures and prolonged drought (Allen et al. 2010). These impacts are more  
51 pronounced in mountainous areas, which experience higher temperature increases (Lindner  
52 et al. 2010). However, what actually-constitutes forest dieback is a source of some debate.

53 For some scholars, tree growth on water-limited sites, species distribution, and the structure  
54 of mountain forests are expected to change dramatically (Lindner et al. 2014). Coverage of  
55 cold-resistant conifers is projected to decrease significantly, replaced by broadleaf species  
56 better able to resist drought conditions (EAA (European Environment Agency) 2017). Goods  
57 and services provided by mountain forests, such as carbon storage, biodiversity, water  
58 storage, protection against natural hazards, and cultural services will also be negatively  
59 impacted (Hansen et al. 2001; Millar et al. 2007). On the contrary, some other scholars  
60 identify opportunities, such as improved tree growth (Kellomäki et al. 1997), northward  
61 expansion of some tree species (Dullinger et al. 2005), and the rise of tree lines in altitude  
62 (Rubel et al. 2017). Saproxylic biodiversity may also profit from climate-induced forest  
63 dieback due to a growing stock of deadwood (Müller and Bütler 2010; Seibold et al. 2016). .  
64 However, some studies show that deadwood is rarely appreciated by forest owners and the  
65 public (Deuffic and Lyser 2012; Gundersen and Frivold 2011 ).

66 Beyond its impact on ecosystems, forest dieback also affects forest owners' incomes, timber  
67 supply for wood-dependent industries, and the provision of ecosystem services for  
68 gatherers, hunters, tourism stakeholders, and visitors. Because forest dieback and its  
69 impacts in time and space are often hard to predict and assess, forest stakeholders face  
70 challenges in adapting their silvicultural models. While forest owners' awareness of climate  
71 change is growing in Europe (Sousa-Silva et al. 2018), scientific debates, paradoxical  
72 injunctions, and contending messages by forest experts hamper the adoption of adaptive  
73 strategies. On the other hand, the strength of belief in local effects and personal experiences  
74 of climate change have strong explanatory power (Broomell et al. 2015). Both of these  
75 aspects may therefore accurately predict adaptation to climate change (Blennow 2012).

76 Even when forest owners link both phenomena, they often focus on the impact on timber  
77 production and associated economic losses, rather than biodiversity loss (Takala et al. 2019).  
78 Accordingly, strategies that promote the conservation of decaying forests for biodiversity  
79 may conflict with more pro-active solutions such as salvage logging, biofuels harvesting and  
80 tree species change. Forest owners may also choose very different strategies, ranging from  
81 non-adaptation, mal-adaptation, reactive adaptation and exceptionally radical changes  
82 (Grothmann and Patt 2005; Sousa-Silva et al. 2018).

83 While many previous studies have investigated forest stakeholders' attitudes towards  
84 climate change, our study is innovative in that it specifically deals with forest dieback. In the  
85 past, perception of dieback has been studied through pest outbreaks (McFarlane and Witson  
86 2008) on a limited number of species such as spruce (Chang et al. 2009) or ash (Fellenor et  
87 al. 2018; Marzano et al. 2019). Furthermore, no survey has examined in depth whether  
88 forest stakeholders attribute forest dieback to climate change. Contrary to abrupt natural  
89 hazards such as windthrows, fires, or ice storms, forest dieback is a "slow-onset disaster".  
90 Forest stakeholders have difficulties coping with this, because its tangible signs may be  
91 visible only months or years later. In theory, gradual hazards such as forest dieback should  
92 be easier to manage than unexpected ones. Slow-onset hazards provide more lead-in time,  
93 giving greater opportunity to employ proactive responses to mitigate their impacts (Staupe-  
94 Delgado 2019). We assume that warnings often go unheard, and responses are put on hold  
95 until impacts become harmful. To explore how forest owners deal with these weak signals,  
96 and how they manage conflicting advice about the appropriate strategies to adopt, we  
97 carried out qualitative interviews with forest stakeholders, including forest owners, forest  
98 managers, and representatives of forest authorities in three mid-mountainous regions that  
99 were comparable but not totally identical in terms of their ecological, socio-economic and  
100 cultural conditions: the Pyrenees Mountains (France), the Bavarian Forest (Germany) and  
101 the Lijiang mountains in Yunnan (China). To identify similarities and differences in  
102 perceptions of forest dieback and adaptive strategies, we explored the following research  
103 questions: What signs of forest dieback do direct forest stakeholders perceive and how do  
104 they explain this phenomenon? In what way (if at all) are they affected by this phenomenon,  
105 and what could be their adaptation strategies?

## 106 **2. Theoretical framework**

107 Social scientists' contributions to the study of climate change adaptation have transcended a  
108 number of disciplines. Geographers and anthropologists have identified many ways in which  
109 traditional practices allow for greater adaptive capacity. They showed how a disruption of  
110 social cohesion reduces people's adaptive capacity, making them less resilient to  
111 environmental stress (Adger 2003). Economists have developed indicators for adaptive  
112 capacity, proposing robust decision-making models (Radke et al. 2017), although examples  
113 of robust adaptation in forestry literature remain scarce (Yousefpour et al. 2017). Many  
114 studies in the field of forestry have shown that economic losses alone do not lead  
115 automatically to major changes (Lidskog and Sjödin 2014; Nelson 2007), as such losses tend  
116 themselves to adversely impact adaptive capacities. In the field of risk perception,  
117 psychologists such as Slovic (1987) made major contributions to the psychometric paradigm  
118 of risk perception, showing that risk levels depend on the individuals' personal beliefs and  
119 emotions relating to a specific risk. However, many of the risk perception measures  
120 employed in survey research with human subjects are either too broad and generic in  
121 nature, or focused too narrowly on an individual component of risk (Wilson et al. 2019). For  
122 Grothmann and Patt (2005), most of these studies have so far neglected the cognitive  
123 dimension of adaptation to climate change, and have failed to consider motivation and  
124 perceived adaptive capacity. To address this shortcoming, they propose a socio-cognitive  
125 model of adaptation and adaptive capacity that compensates for the weaknesses of  
126 adaptation theorizing from a cognitive perspective. To analyze whether forest stakeholders  
127 link forest dieback to climate change, how they perceive this risk, and what capacities they  
128 have to cope with these types of events, we first mobilize Grothmann and Patt's model, that  
129 we complement with Risbey et al's (1999) time-related approach.

130 In the socio-cognitive Model of Private Proactive Adaptation to Climate Change (MPPACC,  
131 Fig.1), Grothmann and Patt (2005) consider both risk perception and perceived adaptive  
132 capacity. Risk perception expresses the perceived probability of being exposed to climate  
133 change impacts, whereas risk appraisal refers to the assessment of a threat's probability and  
134 damage potential (perceived severity). From this perspective, our case studies are original,  
135 as severity is hard to assess, given that nobody knows if and when forest dieback will stop or  
136 start again. The MPPAC framework also introduces the perceived adaptive capacity, i.e. the

137 individual ability to avoid being harmed, along with the costs of action. The perceived  
138 adaptive capacity has three subcomponents: 1) the person's perceived adaptation efficacy,  
139 i.e., the belief of being effective in protecting oneself or others from being harmed, 2)  
140 perceived self-efficacy, referring to the person's perceived ability to carry out adaptive  
141 responses, and 3) perceived adaptation costs. Grothmann and Patt (2005) also make a  
142 distinction between two types of responses to climate change: adaptation and  
143 maladaptation. Adaptive responses prevent damage and occur if risk perception and  
144 perceived adaptive capacity are high. Maladaptation includes avoidant and wrong reactions  
145 (e.g., denial of the threat, wishful thinking, fatalism), and unintentionally increase damage.

146 Figure 1: Model of private proactive adaptation to climate change (MPPACC), Source: own  
147 draft, adapted from Grothmann & Patt (2005) and Risbey et al. (1999)

148

149 To assess some of the MPPACC steps, we also mobilize the analytical grid by Risbey *et al.*  
150 (1999) who identified four stages: 1) Signal detection through definition of thresholds and  
151 alert procedures are essential with slow-onset hazards such as forest dieback, as the first  
152 signs may be considered as "noise" and ignored before there has been any effective  
153 warning; 2) Evaluation describes how the signal is interpreted and how its foreseeable  
154 consequences are evaluated by the system controller (e.g. forest owners); 3) Decision and  
155 response, resulting in a change in behavior; 4) Feedback involves monitoring of decision  
156 outcomes.

### 157 **3. Materials and methods**

158 Because mountain regions are sentinels of climate change, we selected three different cases,  
159 located in mid-mountains, with comparable bioclimatic contexts, coniferous forests, and  
160 where forest dieback has occurred in the last few decades (table 1a). All these forests are  
161 managed for timber production and provide the same kind of amenities (hunting, gathering,  
162 recreation, etc.) to forest owners and local communities. The first case study area (CSA) is  
163 the Pays de Sault in the Pyrenees (Southwestern France) where the main tree species is  
164 Silver fir (*Abies alba*) (37% of surface area), used essentially for high quality timber  
165 production, based on an uneven-aged model and long rotation cycles (120-150 y.o.). Other

166 species are beech (*Fagus sylvatica*, 24% of the forest cover), Scots pines (*Pinus sylvestris*) and  
167 oak (*Quercus pubescens*). In 2003, a severe drought hit Silver firs, which died off dramatically  
168 over the four following years (Cailleret et al. 2014). The second CSA is the Bavarian Forest  
169 (South-eastern Germany) where Norway spruce (*Picea abies*) is largely predominant (60%)  
170 over Beech (*Fagus sylvatica*) and Fir (*Abies alba*). Managed as a monoculture and planted in  
171 shallow soils, spruce populations were significantly damaged by storms in 1983/84, 1999,  
172 and 2007, a severe drought in 2003, and recurrent bark beetle outbreaks since the early  
173 1990s (Lausch et al. 2013). The third CSA is the Lijiang prefecture in Yunnan (China) where a  
174 specific and non-native variety of Yunnan pines (*Pinus yunnanensis* var. *pygmaea*) was  
175 introduced forty years ago to limit the impact of erosion and ease pressure on native oak  
176 forests (*Quercus aquifolioides*) that are harvested for fuelwood. However, since 2009, large  
177 number of Yunnan pines have been dying from drought and pest outbreaks.

178 The cross-comparison of these three CSAs, is relevant, as they are characterized by a  
179 dominant conifer belonging to the same family (*Pinaceae*), surrounded by rather similar  
180 broadleaves (*Fagus* or *Quercus*), and managed for timber production (high quality timber or  
181 fuelwood).

182

183 Tab 1 Case study areas and interviewees' characteristics

184 We used qualitative in-depth interviews to understand forest stakeholders' values,  
185 objectives, motivations, practices, and adaptive strategies. In total, 90 forest stakeholders,  
186 including forest owners, were interviewed between 2016 and 2018 (table 1).

187 We combined two samplings methods: Maximum variation sampling (Miles et al. 2013),  
188 aimed at selecting interviewees with a wide range of variation in dimensions of interest  
189 (respondents living in different social, economic and political communities and diversely  
190 impacted by forest dieback), and snowball sampling (Palinkas et al. 2015), which begins by  
191 identifying forest representatives, whom we asked to provide other useful informants.  
192 Additional names were obtained via these chain referrals, belonging to different forest  
193 community networks. Unlike quantitative surveys, our aim is not to achieve a representative  
194 sample of the target population, but to identify its diversity, and to achieve "information



195 saturation” (Mason 2010; Strauss and Corbin 1994 ). The point of saturation was reached  
196 when new information was no longer forthcoming, and the evidence indicated that all  
197 relevant categories of stakeholders had been sampled. A common interview guide was  
198 created, consisting of five parts: 1) forestry objectives and forest management practices, 2)  
199 damage observed over the last three decades, 3) impacts of forest dieback on biodiversity,  
200 4) adaptation strategies for the future, and 5) socio-demographic data. After transcription,  
201 we categorized the key topics coming out of the interviews (Miles et al. 2013). Following  
202 this, we wrote analytical memos for each case study to identify the diversity of forest  
203 management practices, the perception of forest dieback, their responsiveness to climate  
204 change, and their strategies for the future.

205 As interviewees opted for very different adaptive forest management orientations, ranging  
206 from business-as-usual to transformative strategies, we decided to build a typology of  
207 adaptation behaviors. This typology is based on influential structural variables and logics of  
208 action that are commonly found in forest owners’ typologies (Deuffic et al. 2018; Ficko et al.  
209 2019; Van Herzele and Van Gossum 2008; Weiss et al. 2019) and attitudes towards climate  
210 change (André et al. 2017; Blennow et al. 2012; Lodin et al. 2020; Van Gameren and Zaccai  
211 2015):

- 212 • *Perception of climate change*: In line with the MPPACC model, respondents consider the  
213 perceived probability and severity of future events diversely. Whereas some  
214 stakeholders think climate changes will be progressive and manageable, others fear that  
215 extreme climatic events will severely hit local ecosystems and the forests contained  
216 therein.
- 217 • *Forest stakeholders’ management objectives related to their perceived adaptive*  
218 *capacity*: Forest stakeholders need to find a balance between their objectives (economic  
219 benefits and commodity production, consumption (wood vs. non-wood services)), their  
220 investment capacity, and possible state aid (subsidies, tax relief). These different  
221 objectives lead them to select specific forest management models, ranging from no  
222 management, to close-to-nature forestry, even-aged forestry, short-rotation, etc.;
- 223 • *Adaptation intention*: Forest stakeholders’ intentions to adapt are very diverse (Van  
224 Gameren and Zaccai 2015) and vary between proactive anticipation of the next natural

225 hazard, reactive responses (acting only once a catastrophe has occurred), ignorance of  
226 threats, and procrastination;

227 • *Membership of (in)formal forestry networks*: Forest stakeholders are often  
228 overwhelmed by contradictory information about climatic trends and the robustness of  
229 solutions. As information can be uncertain and ambiguous, participation in social  
230 networks may be helpful to make final decisions (André et al. 2017). In such arenas, they  
231 can find key informants and heuristics of decision, often based on trust in network  
232 participants.

## 233 **4. Results**

### 234 4.1 Perceiving signs of forest dieback: a tricky process

235 Forest dieback is defined as tree mortality noticeably above usual levels (Allen et al. 2010).  
236 However, the identification of lethal and above-average signs of a slow-onset natural hazard  
237 may be a tricky process. Confirming such a prognosis requires a fine sense of observation.

238 In France, interviewees mentioned that Silver firs have always been hit by natural hazards, as  
239 the conditions in which they are planted tend to be either cold and mountainous or dry and  
240 Mediterranean. While most of these past events have now been forgotten about, some  
241 specific events are clearly remembered. For example, older respondents recall that Silver firs  
242 suffered from a severe drought after World War II:

243 « *In 1948, I was cutting trees in the forest. For three years, there was a severe drought.*  
244 *It was dreadful, particularly for the municipal forest that grew on poor calcareous soils.*  
245 *Firs were drying, it was terrible, and trees were red, so red!*” (P16, retired forester,  
246 85 y.o.).

247 These memories helped them to more rapidly identify the first signs of a massive forest  
248 dieback: in spring 2004, where firs turned red, needles fell, and standing trees died. The  
249 event lasted until 2007. A damage assessment was carried out that year by local forest  
250 experts which focused much more on public forests (45 % of the impacted surface) than  
251 private forests, for which data are still missing. Because these smaller private forests are  
252 scattered over a larger area, each with their own set of soil and exposure conditions,  
253 identifying fir dieback is much more difficult.

254 Forest dieback was a “catastrophic event” both at local and regional level, with the surface  
255 area and volume of timber lost reaching 5,500 ha and 94,000 m<sup>3</sup> respectively. However, at  
256 national level, it was considered a “local and minor incident” by forest authorities.

257 In Germany, forest dieback is not a new phenomenon either. In the 1980s a debate about  
258 ‘*Waldsterben*’ (a German term for forest dieback) dominated discourse about forest  
259 damage. (Der Spiegel 1981). Most of the interviewees remembered this crisis, as it impacted  
260 a large part of the German forests, on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” that divided Germany  
261 at that time:

262 *In the Erzgebirge [mountainous region in the east of Germany] even Spruce died. One*  
263 *really feared doom scenarios for our forest during this time, we feared that the forest*  
264 *would be gone as it [Waldsterben] went on.” (B1, representative of forest department,*  
265 *53 y.o)*

266 The most likely cause of *Waldsterben* was a complex disease triggered by cumulative  
267 stresses from increased air pollution. Forty years later, for respondents, air pollution is no  
268 longer the main cause of forest dieback, as they now tend to connect this phenomenon with  
269 extreme weather conditions (e.g. drought, storms). While storm damage is immediately  
270 tangible, pests and diseases emerge later and over a longer time frame. Because disease  
271 detection and tree removal are legal obligations, monitoring of pest outbreaks is time-  
272 consuming and calls for specific knowledge. Forest owners often detect bark beetle  
273 outbreaks too late, and consider them to be a never-ending story:

274 *“When it comes to pest management in the private forest, you always lag behind the*  
275 *[bark] beetle. And it would be presumptuous to say that you can do something against*  
276 *it. We are f\*cked when it [bark beetle season] starts. Nothing more to say.” (B16,*  
277 *representative of forest owner association, 33 y.o.)*

278 In China, most respondents recalled the severe drought of 2010-2012 and the resulting  
279 forest dieback. Since then droughts, have tended to be episodic and recurrent, especially  
280 over the last five years. However, areas affected by forest dieback are spread broadly across  
281 the landscape and forest stakeholders are often unable to measure the affected area with  
282 any level of precision. However, they identify the primary signs of dieback as leaves turning  
283 yellow from March to May, before the arrival of the monsoon season. While seasonality  
284 helps them to detect the primary signs of dieback, its severity is hard to forecast. For local  
285 state forest officers, young Yunnan pines seem to be less resistant to drought than older

286 ones, but are also better able to regrow if rain falls in time. Due to the indeterminate  
287 duration of the event, interviewees struggle to assess tree resilience to drought. A local  
288 forest officer states:

289 *“We are not sure if the tree is really dying, as it grows again in the rainy season. The*  
290 *problem is that even if the trees seem to die and then grow again, eventually there is*  
291 *not actual growth in height and volume”*. (Y14, forest officer, 60 y.o.)

292 Another observed sign of dieback is the increasing amount of pests during the dry season.  
293 Local people think that drought results in forest dieback, which in turn leads to pest  
294 outbreaks. This phenomenon is particularly recognized by local forest users, since  
295 broadleaves have been replaced by Yunnan pine monocultures. Unfortunately, the specific  
296 variety of *Pinus yunannensis var pygmaea* used for afforestation later turned out to be very  
297 sensitive to pests.

#### 298 4.2 Climate change, a plausible explanation for forest dieback?

299 Attribution of causes is important as it allows victims of natural hazards to endow events  
300 with meaning. In our CSAs, none of the incidents of forest dieback were considered to be  
301 “acts of God”, as this would imply that nothing could have been done to prevent them.  
302 Respondents regard forest dieback as mainly “acts of Nature”, and to a lesser extent, “acts  
303 of human beings”, which implies blaming specific groups (e.g. forest experts) and potentially  
304 the decisions taken by forest managers. While climate change would appear to be an ideal  
305 culprit, some interviewees also question the role of humans, especially decisions made in  
306 the field of forest management in the past.

307 In the French CSA, interviewees provided mixed opinions relating to natural or human  
308 causes of forest dieback. While they point to the prolonged period of drought as a trigger,  
309 they also highlight the soil and spatial pre-conditions, especially the tree line zonation, the  
310 lack of water on limestone, and the south-facing exposure that dries up forest stands. Other  
311 factors are more discussed, as they directly question past human decision-making. For the  
312 production-oriented experts, dying trees were often too old (>120 years) and should have  
313 been harvested decades earlier. On the other hand, environmentalists argue that healthy  
314 trees can reach 300 years with no signs of decay. A second debate centers around forestry  
315 techniques: for environmentalists, regular and even-aged forest stands are more sensitive to

316 natural hazards. Understorey management may also mitigate or accelerate forest dieback, as  
317 it can be both an ally and a competitor for water depending on its density. However, local  
318 forest experts opted for intensive clearing of understorey vegetation. This action  
319 dramatically decreased the humidity level and exacerbated the effects of direct sun  
320 exposure. Despite these contrasting viewpoints, the consensus would appear to be that  
321 forest dieback is a consequence of climate change:

322           « For the first time in our lives we saw that the grasslands were drying up  
323           dramatically in spring. Then, in the autumn, trees were turning red and six months  
324           later they died. Finally, we made the connection with climate change (P28, farmer  
325           and forest owner, 59 y.o.).

326 While interviewees admit that winters are milder with far less snow than four decades ago,  
327 they have difficulty with other trends, such as growing Mediterranean influences for the  
328 future. For them, interannual changes in weather are still too significant for them to admit  
329 that there is a real change in climate conditions, even if they clearly see that tree lines are  
330 rising up.

331 In Germany, forest stakeholders explained dieback through a mix of abiotic (storms) and  
332 biotic factors (pests and diseases) on Norway spruce (*Picea abies*). However, this fast  
333 growing and economically important tree species was planted in large-scale monocultures,  
334 which later proved not to be entirely sustainable and forest stakeholders actually admit that  
335 spruces should not have been planted in this way. Because of a shallow root system,  
336 respondents identify water availability as a limiting factor. This species is also very sensitive  
337 to pests. Due to higher temperatures, bark beetles start to breed in early spring, resulting in  
338 several generations per year. Once a forest is impacted, interviewees emphasize that early  
339 detection and fast removal of infested trees are essential, - as required by a Bavarian legal  
340 regulation. However, the first indications of infestation symptoms are not obvious and  
341 require accurate knowledge to identify. Most private forest owners tend therefore to detect  
342 bark beetles too late. On the other hand, a few overcautious forest owners start to harvest  
343 trees, even if they are unsure about an infestation. In both cases, pest outbreaks always  
344 mean economic losses.

345           *“This is the bread tree of the Bavarian Forest. But someone forgot to say that it is*  
346           *[also] the bread tree for the bark beetle.”* (B8, NGO employee, 47 y.o).

347 German respondents also notice that present outbreaks are becoming worse with current  
348 changes in climatic conditions (mild winters and more extreme weather). They also connect  
349 these changes to new forest dynamics, such as a longer vegetation period, later frost  
350 damage on sprouting foliage, drought stress, and a rising tree line for beeches. While climate  
351 change is gradually becoming accepted as a possible cause for forest dieback, the cause-  
352 effect relationships are not straightforward. For instance, forest stakeholders are unable to  
353 determine whether climate change is a triggering or an aggravating factor for bark beetle  
354 outbreaks, given that soil conditions, silvicultural models, and tree species also influence the  
355 level of damage. However, interviewees notice that the combination of factors has mutually-  
356 intensifying effects. Another problem is the unpredictable severity of extreme weather  
357 events that reinforces uncertainty:

358 *“I’m supposed to plant a tree in 2017, which should be the right one in 2067? You*  
359 *can forget it! (...) we have to accept that we speculate. We cannot predict pests.”*  
360 *(B3, forest owner, 65 y.o.).*

361 In China, most interviewees notice that drought has resulted in forest dieback, especially  
362 over the last ten years. They also state that the climate pattern is becoming more irregular,  
363 with less rainfall during the dry season, and heavier precipitation during the rainy season.  
364 Some villagers also observed that glaciers are melting, inducing a lack of water supply during  
365 spring. As these changes in climate patterns are beyond their control, they point out that  
366 afforestation has increased competition for water resources, meaning that the impacts of  
367 drought are – at least partly – of human origin:

368 *“Recently, drought has much affected pines. But, I think the pine monoculture has*  
369 *also caused the water scarcity. However, we are not sure how we can cope with*  
370 *this” (Y7, villager, 42 y.o.).*

371 Other purely human causes are also suggested by local forest officers, who argue that  
372 farmers changed the forest structure by harvesting oak for fuelwood. Forest authorities  
373 launched a large-scale afforestation program in the 1980s to compensate for this. Yunnan  
374 Pine was selected to ensure a fast recovery of fallow lands and decaying forests. While it has  
375 become the dominant species, pest damage has soared and left forest authorities in an  
376 intractable situation:

377           *“We do not encourage investing in Yunnan Pine plantation anymore because pest*  
378           *and drought have much more effect on Yunnan Pine now than by the past.* (forest  
379           officer, 50 y.o).

380 Forest officers grudgingly admit that the non-native variety of Yunnan pine (*P. yunnanensis*  
381 *var pygmaea*) turned out to be more sensitive to pests than the local species (*P.*  
382 *yunnanensis*). While they feel partly responsible for this bad decision, they also consider that  
383 the collection of dead wood by local residents aggravates pest dissemination and  
384 contamination of healthy trees during return transport. They would prefer that people burn  
385 dead wood on site and transform it into charcoal. However, current regulations are not  
386 sufficient to dissuade gatherers of dead wood from applying this recommendation.

#### 387 4.3 The impact of forest dieback on forest communities

388 Since forest dieback has spread over four years, economic losses have been severe for  
389 French forest owners. First, the wood market became saturated, with prices dropping by  
390 around 60%. Second, consumers abandoned Silver fir in favour of new species such as  
391 Douglas fir. Third, while decaying Silver firs were transformed into pallets in the past, other  
392 tree species are now preferred. However, the impacts were not identical for all interviewees.  
393 Public forest managers sold most of their decaying trees just before market congestion  
394 began to be felt. They also offered large and easy-to-harvest volumes to forest enterprises  
395 and sawmills outside the CSA. By contrast, small-scale forest owners were often not  
396 integrated into any professional networks, and were hence not used to negotiating with  
397 contractors. Because of the small size of their properties, coupled with prohibitive transport  
398 costs, private forest owners had difficulty finding foresters.

399           *“Financially, what we got from these dead trees was almost nothing. Forest*  
400           *companies gave us what they wanted. It was between 10 and 15€ or nothing...”*  
401           (P26, forest owner, 65 y.o.)

402 These losses have not been compensated by any financial support from the state and have  
403 had long-term fallouts. Forest owners are very reluctant to invest again, as many have lost  
404 their savings, as well as their ability to reinvest, due to the collapse in price.

405 In the German CSA, it is not easy to quantify forest damage in recent times, as pest  
406 outbreaks and other natural hazards have accumulated over several years. A state forest  
407 manager reported that there had been no regular harvest over the last few years, because of

408 a large pre-existing volume of infested wood. While regional sawmills are overloaded, forest  
409 owner associations are overstretched, and timber prices have declined rapidly. Regular  
410 logging and sales volumes are almost impossible to forecast. In 2017, storm “Kolle”  
411 produced an additional 2.3 million m<sup>3</sup> in damaged wood with estimated costs of 100 Million  
412 Euros. The economic losses for forest owners have been partially compensated by the state  
413 through financial support, tax reliefs and interest-free loans. In the aftermath, the Bavarian  
414 forestry minister initiated the program “Forest modification 2030” which helps to replant  
415 climate-adapted and mixed forests.

416 In China, forest dieback does not directly affect people and communities, as they do not rely  
417 on forests in terms of timber production or tourism. The use of fuelwood has significantly  
418 declined, as villagers move more towards electricity. Furthermore, forests where people  
419 collect non-timber products such as mushrooms are not dying. However, interviewees are  
420 aware of the symbiotic relationship between fungi and trees, and fear that forest dieback  
421 will affect the growth and quality of commercial mushrooms in the mid-term, given that the  
422 mushroom harvest may account for 50 to 80% of their household income (He et al. 2011):

423 *“If trees die, the mushrooms will not grow. The better the trees grow, the better*  
424 *mushrooms grow as well. Mushrooms will also be easier to sell, as they will contain*  
425 *more moisture”* (villager, 48 y.o.)

426

#### 427 4.4 Adaptation responses to climate change and forest dieback

428 Once interviewees had perceived forest dieback and identified its multidimensional causes,  
429 they adopted attitudes were active/passive in nature, depending on influential variables,  
430 such as their logic of action (Deuffic et al. 2018; Van Gameren and Zaccai 2015) which is  
431 often related to their forest management objectives and priority given to climate change  
432 among concerns of forest management, their personal direct observation of events, and  
433 their perceived adaptation intention and capacity.

434 Knowledge in forest management, often related to membership of (in)formal forestry  
435 networks and access to key informant people, is also a decisive factor in decision-making as  
436 well as the existence of a contingency plan and specific subsidies that can help forest owners  
437 overcome the crisis.



438

Figure 2: Adaptation responses to forest diebacks and their drivers

439

#### 440 **4.4.1 Proactive forest owners (G1)**

441 These stakeholders are convinced that climate is changing locally, as they have observed  
442 tangible signs over the last decades. These medium to large-scale stakeholders often occupy  
443 official positions on the boards of forest institutions. As leaders, they gather information on  
444 climate issues and communicate them actively. Strongly attached to their forest, they earn  
445 a significant part of their living from timber production. Endowed with strong economic and  
446 cognitive capacities, they have clear opinions on strategies for coping with forest dieback.  
447 However, they opt for opposing strategies.

448 Subgroup G1a is often pessimistic about the adaptive capacity of local tree species. While  
449 these species remain dominant on their property, they consider that water will become a  
450 limiting factor in the future. They introduce new species after clear-cuts or salvage logging:  
451 Cedar (*Cedrus atlantica*) in the French Pyrenees; Silver fir (*Abies alba*) and Douglas fir  
452 (*Pseudotsuga menziesii*) in the German CSA as these species are as productive as spruce and  
453 highly valuable on wood markets; and oak (*Quercus aquifolioides*) to balance the dominance  
454 of pine in China.

455 In contrast, subgroup G1b promotes nature-based solutions (NBS). They rely on integrated  
456 pest management (IPM) and natural biological processes to control pest outbreaks.  
457 Managing mixed, uneven-aged forests is their forestry standard now and for the future.  
458 Instead of trying to escape natural disturbances, they increase forest resilience by mixing  
459 stand structures and local thermo-resistant species.

#### 460 **4.4.2 Reactive forest stakeholders (G2)**

461 Owning medium to small properties, and well-educated in terms of forestry, G2 forest  
462 owners participate in peer group discussions but never take the lead. They do not earn their  
463 living from the forests, which they see as part of their personal savings, except in the  
464 Chinese CSA, where mushroom picking significantly improves revenues. Adaptive  
465 capacities are limited by medium or low economic resources or, in the Chinese CSA, by their  
466 lack of empowerment in decision-making. Contrary to G1, their adaptation intention is

467 mainly reactive, as they do not anticipate the next extreme event. They prefer to know  
468 exactly what the next calamity will be, and act accordingly. Due to different levels of risk  
469 adaptation, this group can also be divided into two subgroups.

470 Sub-group G2a considers that there are no equal alternatives to the dominant local tree  
471 species. They simply apply progressive shifts, such as increasing the frequency and intensity  
472 of thinning and shortening rotations. They therefore gamble on a belief that harvest benefits  
473 will cover the losses incurred between two disturbances. As financial capacities are limited,  
474 they cannot afford cost-prohibitive plantations of new tree species.

475 Subgroup G2b forest owners are less involved in professional networks, and have smaller  
476 properties than G2a. Due to their lower level of knowledge, they identify bark beetle  
477 infestations later, and copy others to cope with uncertainty (Weber 2010). Salvage logging  
478 and rotation shortening are their main adaptation strategies. They also plan to mix trees, but  
479 only with local species and in the future as they procrastinate on strategic decisions.

#### 480 **4.4.3 "Wait and see" forest stakeholders (G3)**

481 This group consists of small to very small-scale forest owners and users (for the Chinese CSA)  
482 who feel less concerned with climate change or who have lost part of their forests in the  
483 past. Very low profitability hampers their capacity to act or even react to natural disasters.  
484 Often not members of any organizations, they have difficulty learning about pest outbreaks  
485 in time, and struggle to find contractors for salvage logging. These adverse conditions hinder  
486 the implementation of adaptive solutions. Two main attitudes can be found:

487 Downhearted and resigned observers (G3a), who have often engaged enthusiastically in  
488 forestry in the past, have incurred such high losses emotional stress, that they just wait  
489 passively for the next catastrophe to take place, with a hint of fatalism. They do not have  
490 enough capacity and willingness to re-invest time and money into an industry which has  
491 already deprived them of their savings.

492 Sub-group (G3b) consists of inactive forest stakeholders who have not managed their forest  
493 for a significant period of time. The impact of climate change just confirms their opinion  
494 about forestry as a bad business. This attitude is observed especially in the European CSAs.

## 495 **5. Discussion**

### 496 5.1 A global phenomenon with context-specific knock-on effects

497 The MPPACC model shows that *ecological factors* significantly shape forest stakeholders'  
498 perception of forest dieback as changing climatic conditions gradually exacerbate their  
499 effects. The French and Chinese respondents are fully aware that droughts increase water  
500 scarcity, hamper cultivation efforts, and ultimately become a dominating and limiting factor.  
501 In Germany and China, interviewees associate deteriorating weather conditions with pest  
502 outbreaks. While forest stakeholders in all CSAs are worried about changing ecological  
503 conditions for trees and protected wildlife species, they do not care so much about  
504 saproxylic fauna and flora – except for mushrooms in the Chinese CSA - as also observed by  
505 Dunn (2005). Alongside ecological factors, most forest stakeholders also admit that some  
506 forest management decisions, – (e.g. planting in shallow soils, choosing an unsuitable  
507 species, opening the forest canopy by thinning) – worsen the effects of dieback. While  
508 drought and pest outbreaks are freak events, outside the control of human beings, forest  
509 stakeholders admit they have been partly responsible for worsening the effects of those  
510 natural hazards. Acknowledging responsibility opens the door to reflexivity, self-criticism,  
511 and possibly changes in practices, as forest owners and managers now admit that nature is  
512 no longer the one and only culprit.

513 In all of our CSAs, climate change-induced forest dieback affects the local economy.  
514 However, its severity depends on the adaptive capacity and resilience of the wood sector. In  
515 Germany, the wood sector is weakened by the multiplicity and additionality of forest  
516 damage. Regional forest authorities have set up contingency plans and economic support  
517 including incentives for tree diversification with broadleaves, despite demand in the wood  
518 market still being centered on conifers. In the French CSA, the economic impact of forest  
519 dieback is moderate, since the wood sector has partially recovered from the 2003-2007  
520 drought. Nevertheless, this crisis has changed the landscape of the wood market, as the  
521 wood industry gradually shifts from Silver fir to Douglas fir. In China, the economic impact of  
522 dieback is considered moderate. Timber is not the main product, and while mushroom  
523 quality suffers from changing climate conditions, the resource is still present.

524 Social factors have a rather low influence on forest stakeholders' perception in France and  
525 China, but a moderate influence in Germany. In the French CSA, the dieback issue was  
526 mainly discussed within the forest owners' community. Its presence in the media was limited  
527 to regional newspapers. There were no public debates, since solutions were discussed in  
528 restricted technocratic arenas. In China, forest management is under the control of local  
529 forest authorities, meaning that the local population has very little freedom to steer forest  
530 policies. However, forest tenure reforms are slowly being implemented to devolve land-use  
531 rights and forest ownership of collective forest areas to individual households (He 2017),  
532 offering more possibilities for forest users to discuss adaptive measures. In Germany, agenda  
533 setting of forest dieback has been more prevalent, due to the severity and repetition of the  
534 crises and the echoing with *Waldsterben*.

535 Forest policy makers and the large network of forest owners' associations have also fostered  
536 more radical changes in adaptive policies, although there is still room to expand advisory  
537 services for adaptation planning. In line with a recent Delphi study (Sacher and Mayer 2019)  
538 participating experts clearly identify climate change as the most important influencing factor  
539 on forests in Bavaria in the coming decades.

## 540 5.2 A slow-burning crisis with unequal adaptation costs

541 Despite the different socio-economic and cultural contexts, a common feeling of insecurity  
542 about climate trends emerges among forest stakeholders in the CSAs. Thanks to growing  
543 experiences of natural hazards, discussions in peer groups and monitoring by experts,  
544 respondents have learned to identify weak signs of forest dieback. They are gradually  
545 beginning to connect forest dieback with climate change, and consider that both will likely  
546 become more prominent in the future. However, they still have difficulty evaluating the  
547 severity of these events, which may or may not cease due to weather variability. This  
548 perceived severity also depends on local conditions and the scale of the damage, as signs of  
549 forest dieback are dispersed in space and time in France and China, and spread over a large  
550 area in Germany.

551 Forest dieback calls into question the deterministic forest growth models which have led  
552 forest stakeholders' behavior up until now (Lawrence 2017). Even the linear timeline  
553 proposed by Risbey et al. (1999) is challenged. Contrary to sudden-onset disasters such as

554 storms or fires, the signal detection period of forest dieback never ends, and is often  
555 intertwined with the next steps (evaluation and decision). Forest dieback looks like a slow-  
556 burning crisis (Staupe-Delgado 2019). Its elusive and uncertain nature reduces the  
557 monitoring vigilance of forest institutions and leads fatigue. When alert thresholds are not  
558 always easy to detect, and weak signals are ignored, it takes much longer for the alarm to be  
559 raised, particularly when there is no significant complaint from stakeholder groups, and  
560 when the issue is present in the media. Because the distinction between dieback and decline  
561 is not very clear in the literature (Ciesla and Donaubauer 1994), forest decision-makers  
562 produce fragmented responses.

563 In terms of adaptation costs, offering equitable opportunities for the most disadvantaged  
564 forest stakeholders to improve their forest management is a big challenge. For Adger *et al.*  
565 (2009), limits on stakeholders ability to adapt are socially constructed, as they depend on  
566 goals, values, risk, social choice, and power structures within society. In all our CSAs, large-  
567 scale forest owners (e.g. groups G1a and G1b) have better access to information. They can  
568 test diverse forestry models by anticipation (before the crisis) or ex-post, on several stands,  
569 and with marginal impacts in case of failure. By contrast, small-scale owners (e.g. group 2b,  
570 3a, and 3b) with limited economic capacities and poor access to information will not be able  
571 to afford high levels of investment in new forestry models. In China, the recurrence of  
572 drought weakens mushrooms pickers' activities and leads them to diversify their harvest  
573 with alternatives such as nuts, fruits and medicinal herbs (He et al. 2009). Even when  
574 institutional support for reforestation exists as in the German CSA, it rarely covers the full  
575 costs and never the loss of future value of mature trees. The challenge for forest decision-  
576 makers is to propose solutions, which can be implemented by as many forest owners as  
577 possible. Along with financial support, they also need to offer information about these new  
578 forestry models to enable informed choices.

### 579 5.3 Adapting through practices

580 Once forest stakeholders consider that forest dieback is present, they choose between  
581 different adaptive strategies. For two decades, experts have framed general and often non-  
582 specific recommendations that suggest maintaining current ecological patterns in their  
583 present state via adaptation (Hagerman and Pelai 2018). However, experts' legitimacy has

584 been badly damaged in the three CSAs and the stakeholders could have seriously questioned  
585 their recommendations. Despite this, forest owners seem to trust experts overall. As  
586 observed by Lidskog and Sjödin (2015) in Sweden, forest experts' epistemic authority – i.e.  
587 the legitimacy to define, describe, and explain bounded domains of reality - has been  
588 gradually restored. In line with Bulkeley (2000) our study suggests that social networks are  
589 strategic arenas where local knowledge, values, and scientific information are assessed to  
590 create legitimate understandings. These peer networks are valuable in connecting  
591 information about climate risks and opportunities for adaptation to the actual forest  
592 property (André et al. 2017). While risk perception is an important precondition for changes  
593 in forestry practices, risk adaptation requires trust in informants. Typically for wicked  
594 problems like climate change, forest stakeholders' decision-making combines intuitions  
595 based on individual experience with explanations offered by actors with high cultural  
596 authority (Sarewitz 2011). On this basis, forest stakeholders' decision-making is a mix of  
597 confirmed facts (their direct observations), accepted facts (from epistemic authorities they  
598 trust), beliefs and perceptions of climate change, forest management objectives, and the  
599 norms and values they prioritize (security, profitability, achievement, conformity).

600 Finally, forest stakeholders often prioritize three main adaptive responses, focusing primarily  
601 on maintaining and cautiously adapting existing forest management patterns and processes.  
602 Shifting to new system configurations is chosen only when no other solutions are available.  
603 The first basic and classic recommendation often found in guidelines for adaptive strategies  
604 consists in shortening rotations. While this adaptive practice is often ecologically harmful as  
605 it significantly changes the structure of the forest stands (Roberge et al. 2016), it is rather  
606 simple to implement by forest owners from a technical point of view and even sometimes  
607 profitable. Partially adopted by French and German forest stakeholders, this strategy has  
608 also the advantage of being neither constraining nor irreversible as the harvesting decision  
609 may be postponed according to the fluctuation of the wood market demand. Moreover,  
610 wood sector industrialists also entice forest owners to adopt this practice because they  
611 prefer processing wood of low to medium diameters. The second recommendation consists  
612 in cultivating a mixed and structured forest. This is not a new concept, but is gaining  
613 attention in Germany and France, even if its implementation will require specific information  
614 and education programmes for forest owners to enhance their adaptive capacities. The third

615 and most transformative recommendation consists in tree species substitution, including  
616 displacing decaying trees with new non-local and more resilient species. Often motivated by  
617 the definitive decline of timber production, along with the expected rise in their wood price  
618 (Hanewinkel et al. 2013), this adaptive strategy is far from being adopted without  
619 circumspection. As observed in Sweden and Ireland after severe storms (Deuffic and Ní  
620 Dhubháin 2020; Lidskog and Sjödin 2014), some forest stakeholders still regard the  
621 traditional tree species as the best option. They are incentivized to maintain these traditional  
622 species through nurseries, advisory systems, sawmills and commercial outlets which are  
623 often path-dependent on these trees. In China and France, forest stakeholders still believe in  
624 the resilience of the traditional tree species against climate change, and new tree species are  
625 introduced only for trials on small plots. In contrast, German stakeholders plan to replace  
626 Norway spruce with broadleaves in the long-term.

627 These recommendations seem to lack ambition for Hagerman and Pelaï (2018) who also  
628 advocate transformational management pathways. However, for the most transformative  
629 pathways, adaptive capacity is crucial, as it depends on context, related both to governance  
630 measures and real room for maneuver (Gupta et al. 2010). On the other hand, a lack of  
631 adaptive capacity, e.g. insufficient levels of time, money, knowledge, social or institutional  
632 support, leads to a weaker adaptation intention. In the German CSA, the adaptation strategy  
633 is managed by the regional forest authorities with strong incentives and supports actual  
634 transformation of the forest socio-ecosystem in the long term. In France, incentives to  
635 change practices mainly come from the key forest economic players, who suggest adopting  
636 new practices, not only to adapt to climate change but also to the market demand. This  
637 ambiguous and short-term suggestion can be interpreted as a kind of “climate change  
638 washing” – in reference to greenwashing – as these dominant stakeholders in the wood  
639 sector play on private owners’ aversion to risk in order to preserve their own vested  
640 interests.

#### 641 5.4 Maladaptation, a real but normative issue?

642 Our criticism of the MPPACC model mainly concerns the issue of maladaptation. This  
643 normative assertion presupposes that some options are better than others. After natural  
644 hazards, there is a strong propensity and social pressure to drive major changes. However,

645 forest stakeholders often fall back into routines and only make slight shifts in their forest  
646 management practices (Deuffic and Ní Dhubháin 2020; Lidskog and Sjödin 2014). This raises  
647 the question as to whether their decisions are necessarily maladaptive. As noticed by Adger  
648 (2009), adaptation decisions taken today and considered as “good”, reasonable or rational  
649 may have negative impacts for future generations. As soon as the first signs of forest dieback  
650 are identified, experts often consider salvage logging as the best options. However,  
651 knowing whether to cut down or leave in place trees after a natural hazard is far from easy  
652 (Petucco et al. 2020). On the one hand, forest stakeholders who have experienced forest  
653 dieback in the past know that ignoring warnings and putting responses on hold often makes  
654 impacts unnecessarily costly to reverse. On the other hand, acting too promptly may deprive  
655 them of future ecosystem services, as some trees may recover from moderate droughts. The  
656 term ‘maladaptation’ also suggests that forest owners alone are responsible, but the socio-  
657 economic and political context needs to be considered. Forest stakeholders often return to  
658 routines because they lack the capacity to implement new forest management models  
659 without specific help, such as a relevant information and knowledge system (Lawrence et al.  
660 2020), e.g. financial incentives, etc..

661 This study suggests adding the unpredictability of events and insecurity of forest  
662 stakeholders to the MPPACC model. While extreme weather events are interpreted as  
663 tangible signs of climate change, they contribute to a persistent feeling of anxiety. Their  
664 slow-onset characteristics make the identification of climate impacts highly unpredictable.  
665 Interactions between factors further complicate the identification of causes by forest  
666 stakeholders, as they are heavily intertwined. While abiotic stressors such as droughts are  
667 often the triggering event, pest outbreaks appear as aggravating and potentially fatal  
668 factors.

669 With regard to the temporal sequences proposed by Risbey et al. (1999), the four steps  
670 (detection, evaluation, decision, and feedback) are easily identified in the three CSAs.  
671 However, their linearity is questioned by the time-related specificity of forest dieback.  
672 Because it is a slow-onset phenomenon, each stage may be reinitialized before the following  
673 one. New configurations of events, such as scientific breakthroughs, innovation, and changes  
674 in power relations may slow down or accelerate the pace - and even the order - of steps  
675 taken in the decision making process. In the German case study, the succession and



676 intertwinement of hazards made the supposedly linear decision process very difficult to  
677 maintain. The additionality of damage resets and progressively reduces the adaptive  
678 capacity of the most fragile forest stakeholders such as small-scale forest owners and  
679 sawmills.

## 680 **6. Conclusion**

681 This paper aimed to analyze the perception of forest dieback and adaptive strategies in three  
682 mountain forest contexts in France, Germany and China using a qualitative approach. In line  
683 with the specific nature of forest dieback as a “slow-onset disaster”, we show that forest  
684 owners have to deal with weak signals and manage conflicting advice about the appropriate  
685 strategies to adopt. For respondents in all CSAs, forest dieback is not a new phenomenon, as  
686 they remember similar events in the past. Their observations help them to identify the first  
687 signs of a massive forest dieback that they explain as a mixture of abiotic and biotic factors,  
688 with climate change as an aggravating factor. The respondents convey uncertainties about  
689 cause-effect relationships which are not easy to establish and sometimes controversial.

690 While all interviewed forest stakeholders are affected by forest dieback, the socio-economic  
691 impacts differ. In France, public forest managers could cope with the consequences much  
692 better than small-scale forest owners. The economic losses also have long-term impacts,  
693 because forest owners are reluctant to re-invest in forestry. In the German CSA, economic  
694 impacts are huge, because of congestion in the wood market, and a drop in prices. This  
695 triggers public interventions which partially compensate forest owners’ economic losses  
696 through public financial support. In contrast, in the Chinese CSA current forest dieback does  
697 not directly affect local communities, as they do not rely economically on timber.

698 While a climate change risk appraisal is given exhibited by forest stakeholders in all CSAs,  
699 their adaptation appraisal is often insufficient to form an adaptation intention. This is  
700 especially the case for small-scale forest owners who perceive their self-efficacy to be low,  
701 and the costs of adaptation to be prohibitive. As a result, we recommend strengthening  
702 adaptation capacities by providing more information, encouraging greater involvement in  
703 social forestry networks, offering financial support to this deprived category.

704 In terms of adaptive strategies, respondents can be grouped into three profiles: proactive,  
705 reactive and wait-and-see stakeholders. While these groups do not necessarily differ in their  
706 belief in climate change, they do vary in terms of their economic investment capacities,  
707 economic dependency, emotional attachment to their forests, knowledge level, and  
708 participation in institutional networks. Some studies show that promoting local self-  
709 governance and the participation of external stakeholders in forest management planning or  
710 in regional forest or climate change policy adaptation may be a way of overcoming path  
711 dependency, behavioral obstacles and potential policy failures in implementing adaptation  
712 (Bouriaud et al. 2015). However, our study also underlines that, beyond the mantra of forest  
713 user and stakeholder participation, this process may also be surreptitiously influenced by the  
714 most powerful and influential participants for their vested interests. Making use of their  
715 epistemic authority, they often influence less informed stakeholders.

716 This study is also prone to limitations typical to qualitative research, as we cannot infer a  
717 statistical distribution of profiles to the groups. We suggest a follow-up study with a  
718 quantitative research design to test the extent to which these results could be generalized  
719 for the CSA, and how stakeholders are distributed into the identified groups. As forest  
720 stakeholders only make up a relatively small part of their local communities, it may also be  
721 beneficial to assess lay people's attitudes towards forest dieback. Lay people are not forest  
722 experts but, once they are mobilized, they may become very influential in decision-making.

723

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738 Conflict of Interest

739 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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