Accéder directement au contenu Accéder directement à la navigation
Pré-publication, Document de travail

Price Signaling and Quality Monitoring in Markets for Credence Goods

Abstract : We explore the interplay between price signaling and independent monitoring for communicating information about the credence attribute of a good, such as environmental quality. We augment the standard model of price signaling allowing consumers to use the results of noisy monitoring as a complementary source of information. We show that monitoring restores the credibility of price signaling by saving partly or fully the signaling cost borne by green rms to deter cheating. A key reason for this is that monitoring compensates for the lack of information resulting from arbitrary beliefs based on surprising prices. The more accurate monitoring, the cheaper price signaling. The signaling behavior of green rms also depends on their number. We determine which proportion of rms choose to improve environmental quality.
Type de document :
Pré-publication, Document de travail
Liste complète des métadonnées
Déposant : Laurent Garnier <>
Soumis le : mardi 5 janvier 2021 - 17:32:08
Dernière modification le : mardi 2 février 2021 - 15:10:04


WP 2021-01.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)


Distributed under a Creative Commons Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification 4.0 International License


  • HAL Id : hal-03098440, version 1


Philippe Mahenc, Alexandre Volle. Price Signaling and Quality Monitoring in Markets for Credence Goods. 2021. ⟨hal-03098440⟩



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers