The efficient management of common pool resources has long been a subject of economic inquiry, with seminal works by Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) underscoring the importance of regulatory measures. In recent times, there has been a shift towards incorporating behavioral insights into policy design, with 'nudges'-subtle policy tools aimed at influencing decision-making-gaining increasing attention. This paper explores the effectiveness of nudges, particularly those rooted in descriptive and injunctive social norms, in the management of common pool resources within the framework of differential games. Using a series of economic experiments, we examine how these nudges influence individual and group behaviors in dynamic settings. Contrary to expectations, our results reveal that nudges, in this context, do not significantly impact the strategic decision-making processes in managing shared resources. This finding challenges the prevailing assumption about the universal applicability of nudges and suggests a need for a more nuanced understanding of their role in diverse economic scenarios.