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Accord climatique : concessions et ratifications

Abstract : We consider a bargaining game aiming at the full ratification of a climate treaty. Three distinct coalitions are considered: a pro-regime coalition, the so-called Kyoto group, an anti-regime coalition made of the countries rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the G77 coalition made of developing countries. We assume that the pro-regime coalition wants to ratify the treaty as such while the two other coalitions condition ratification to further concessions. Employing an alternating offers model, we study the concession the pro-regime coalition should make for the others to accept ratify the treaty. We show that the more binding is the ratification constraint of the pro-regime coalition, the lowest is the concession. Conversely, the more binding the ratification constraints of the two adverse coalitions, the highest should be the concession.
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Submitted on : Saturday, May 30, 2020 - 11:58:44 AM
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Pierre Courtois, Tarik Tazdait. Accord climatique : concessions et ratifications. Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, 59 (4), pp.719-735. ⟨10.3917/reco.594.0719⟩. ⟨hal-02658287⟩

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