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How to play games? Nash versus berge behaviour rules

Abstract : Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.
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  • HAL Id : hal-02749251, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 370053
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Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdait. How to play games? Nash versus berge behaviour rules. 11 Journées Louis-André Gérard Varet, Jun 2012, Marseille, France. ⟨hal-02749251⟩

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