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Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements

Abstract : As an alternative to the environmental cartel approach, we assume that an international environmental agreement aims simply at providing a collective response to a perceived threat. Given this less demanding concept of cooperation and considering that most treaties become enforceable only after ratification by a sufficient number of participants, we examine the set of self-enforceable agreements. This set contains first-best but also second-best agreements that do not maximize the collective welfare of members but meet environmental and/or participative requirements. We study the properties of this set and discuss admissible values of targets and thresholds that favour economics over environmental objectives and vice versa.
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Submitted on : Friday, June 5, 2020 - 1:27:00 PM
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  • HAL Id : hal-02796209, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 370008


Pierre Courtois, Guillaume Haeringer. Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements. Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation, 2015, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series. ⟨hal-02796209⟩



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