Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles International Journal of Game Theory Year : 2010

Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

(1, 2)
1
2

Abstract

Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.

Dates and versions

halshs-00754436 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

Identifiers

Cite

Laurent Lamy. Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity. International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, 39 (3), pp.503-510. ⟨10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z⟩. ⟨halshs-00754436⟩
94 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More