Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

From Search to Match: When Loan Contracts Are Too Long

Abstract : A model of lending is presented where loans are established in matches between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers) who meet in a search process. Projects turn out randomly a quick payoff or a long-term payoff that requires a rollover of the loan. The model generates, under proper parameter conditions, two steady states without or with rollover, and rollover is socially inefficient. Under imperfect information, the standard debt contract is privately efficient. However, it extends the domains of equilibria with socially inefficient rollover. The global dynamics displays a continuum of equilibrium paths that each exhibits sudden discontinuities--crises--in which the mass of outstanding loans is reduced by a quantum amount of terminations. Crises have a cleansing effect.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Caroline Bauer Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 9:50:33 AM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:01 AM

Links full text



Christophe Chamley, Céline Rochon. From Search to Match: When Loan Contracts Are Too Long. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, 2011, 43 (s2), pp.385-411. ⟨10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00442.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00754511⟩



Record views