This chapter analyses the relationship between the government of trade at the scale of the EU and that of industries – cars and aquaculture. In accordance with the majority of texts in EU studies or IR examining EU trade politics (Hanson, 1998; Hocking and McGuire, 2002; Young and Peterson, 2006; Dür 2007), we would expect the doctrine behind EU government of trade to be one of global free trade rather than interventionism, shaped by export-driven interests not import ones, dominated by conflicts between the Commission versus member states and firms, and all this free from e-NGO pressures. We would also expect to find evidence of the EU as a ‘conflicted trade power’ (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006), managing tensions within its deep trade agenda. To date, scholars have located these as playing out during GATT and WTO round negotiations, during which the Commission, although initially attempting to replicate on a global scale its social and environmental value-system in myriad trading agreements, ultimately abandoned this agenda at Doha and Cancun (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006; Young and Peterson, 2006): What did our research actually find? Rather than liberalisation per se, we found an interdependence of liberalisation with social corporate responsibility narratives, whereby the former gave content to EU public rules and the latter to private standards. This has created tensions between public and private domains over deep trade politics. We also found a politics driven by problematizations of import issues, as well as export ones. We have further found that it is not just conflicts between the European Commission and member states which have contributed to setting the problematizations and instruments that make up this EU-wide policy. For example in aquaculture, other actors engage, e.g., e-NGOs, feed companies and retailers; in automobiles, these are large car manufacturers. Political tensions over trade have therefore not been limited to conflicts between public actors. Finally, although large corporations clearly have had significant influence here, we would not share the conclusion that environmental NGOs are having little impact on trading policies in Europe. Rather the rise in private action governing trade has created opportunities for their engagement, which nonetheless remains indirect.