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Article Dans Une Revue International Review of Law and Economics Année : 2018

Overburdened judges

Résumé

We develop a double-sided moral hazard model in which the production of justice depends on two tasks (jurisdictional and administrative). The jurisdictional task can be provided only by a judge (the agent) while the administrative task can be provided either by the government (the principal) and/or by the judge. However, the judge performs the administrative task at a higher unit cost. First, we show that the rst-best situation is such that the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task. Second, we show that two forms of (second-best) optimal contract can emerge when neither the government's effort nor the judge's effort is contractible: either the incentives are shared between the government and the judge and the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task, or the judge faces high-powered incentives which induce her to exert effort to provide both tasks. Our model proposes a rationale for judges work overload observed in many countries.
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Dates et versions

hal-02621924 , version 1 (26-05-2020)

Identifiants

Citer

Ludivine Roussey, Raphaël Soubeyran. Overburdened judges. International Review of Law and Economics, 2018, 55, pp.21-32. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003⟩. ⟨hal-02621924⟩
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