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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2018

Overburdened judges

Résumé

We develop a double-sided moral hazard model in which the production of justice depends on two tasks (jurisdictional and administrative). The jurisdictional task can be provided only by a judge (the agent) while the administrative task can be provided either by the government (the principal) and/or by the judge. However, the judge performs the administrative task at a higher unit cost. First, we show that the rst-best situation is such that the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task. Second, we show that two forms of (second-best) optimal contract can emerge when neither the government's effort nor the judge's effort is contractible: either the incentives are shared between the government and the judge and the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task, or the judge faces high-powered incentives which induce her to exert effort to provide both tasks. Our model proposes a rationale for judges work overload observed in many countries.
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Dates et versions

hal-02791013 , version 1 (05-06-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02791013 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 421342

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Ludivine Roussey, Raphaël Soubeyran. Overburdened judges. 2018. ⟨hal-02791013⟩
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