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Pré-publication, Document de travail

Collusion and downstream entry in a vertically integrated industry

Abstract : We analyse the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. We present an original model of horizontal product differentiation on the final market and characterize the structures of this market for which an entry threat facilitates collusion between incumbents. While the entry threat leaves collusion and deviation profits unchanged, it lowers profits in punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat discourages deviations and facilitates collusion, thus benefiting incumbents.
Type de document :
Pré-publication, Document de travail
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Déposant : Migration Prodinra <>
Soumis le : samedi 6 juin 2020 - 03:37:54
Dernière modification le : mercredi 5 août 2020 - 03:08:13


  • HAL Id : hal-02807310, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 320472


Eric Avenel, Stéphane Caprice. Collusion and downstream entry in a vertically integrated industry. 2012. ⟨hal-02807310⟩



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