Collective incentives : what design for agri-environmental contracts ?

Abstract : The evaluations of the French rural development program point out the low participation of farmers in the national Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) granting compensation payments to farmers committing to reduce their use of pesticides. Using a choice modeling approach, our objective is to test whether the introduction of a collective dimension in agri-environmental contracts can enhance farmers’ initial participation in AES and so initiate a group dynamics favoring a change of practices towards less intensive use of pesticides on a territory. Our collective dimension relies on a monetary ‘bonus’ paid per hectare engaged to each farmer who has signed a contract, provided that 50% of the area of interest is enrolled at the end of the contract. The objective of the paper is to measure empirically with a choice experiment the preference of farmers for this type of conditional bonus. We conduct an evaluation on hypothetical contracts for low-herbicide practices in the Languedoc-Roussillon region, located in the South East of France, where nearly two thirds of agricultural area is dedicated to vineyards. We show with a sample of 317 wine-growers that introducing a conditional bonus can be a way to improve participation and land enrollment for a lower budgetary outlay.