Producer Organizations, Bargaining, and Asymmetric Information - INRAE - Institut national de recherche pour l’agriculture, l’alimentation et l’environnement Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue American Journal of Agricultural Economics Année : 1999

Producer Organizations, Bargaining, and Asymmetric Information

Organisations de producteurs, négociation et information asymétrique

Résumé

As pointed out by Sexton, a cooperative's pricing rule can be affected by divergent interests of heterogeneous members. When such competing interests are present, production decisions may depart from the first-best optimum, and the marginal cost pricing rule cum fee/rebate may no longer be implementable. In a recent article, Vercammen, Fulton, and Hyde study such departures assuming a con- tinuum of producers' types and a nondiscri- minating management board. While their sim- ulation analysis indicates that the first-best is sometimes attainable in such instances, their theoretical analysis seems to suggest it is not. This article extends the analysis of the in- centive problems faced in producers' orga- nization by assuming that the different farmer types constitute different groups with differ- ent bargaining powers. Departures from an equal sharing of the oligopolistic gain appear as long as the bargaining power of a group does not correspond to its relative importance in the farm population. However, when bargaining disparities are small enough, the quantities produced will still correspond to first-best levels, and incentive-compatible sharing of the oligopolistic gain can be effected by a mixture of two-part pricing and nonlinear cost recovery. When the less (more) cost-efficient farmers have sufficiently high bargaining power, the redistributive objective conflicts with efficiency and the organization overproduces (underproduces) compared to the first-best level. Moreover, the nonlinear scheme may be implemented by offering two two-part schedules, one with a unit price equal to the marginal revenue that members of the less powerful group choose, and the other with a unit price greater or lower than this level depending on the productivity of the most influential group.
Nous dérivons les règles de tarification d'une coopérative agricole composée de producteurs qui se distinguent par leur rentabilité et leur pouvoir de négociation au sein de la l'organisation. La règle de tarification optimale est un système non linéaire qui peut être mis en œuvre par un de prix en deux parties dépendant de la quantité ou par une combinaison d'une tarification en deux parties avec remboursement des coûts.

Dates et versions

hal-02968359 , version 1 (15-10-2020)

Identifiants

Citer

Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Robert Chambers. Producer Organizations, Bargaining, and Asymmetric Information. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1999, 81 (3), pp.602-609. ⟨10.2307/1244021⟩. ⟨hal-02968359⟩
7 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More