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An individual-based model of innovation diffusion mixing social influence and rational anticipation

Abstract : We propose an individual-based model of innovation diffusion and explore its main dynamical properties. In the model, individuals give an a priori social value to the innovation, which evolves during their interactions with the Relative agreement influence model. This model offers the possibility of including a minority of extremists, with extreme and very certain opinions. Individuals who give a good social value to the innovation, tend to look for information which allows them to evaluate a more precise individual benefit of the adoption. They can get such information from their associates or from the media. If their social value is bad, neither they consider the information or transmit it. Individuals adopt the innovation if the overall evaluation including the social value and the individual benefit is good enough with a sufficient certainty. The main result of the model exploration is that innovations with high social values and bad individual benefit have more chances to succeed, than innovations with bad social value and high individual benefit. Moreover, in some cases, a minority of extremists can have a very important impact on the propagation, by polarizing the social value.
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https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02587131
Contributor : Migration Irstea Publications <>
Submitted on : Friday, May 15, 2020 - 11:50:01 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 23, 2021 - 5:22:03 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02587131, version 1
  • IRSTEA : PUB00018516

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Guillaume Deffuant, S. Huet, Frédéric Amblard. An individual-based model of innovation diffusion mixing social influence and rational anticipation. American Journal of Sociology, University of Chicago Press, 2005, 110 (4), pp.1041-1069. ⟨hal-02587131⟩

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