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Journal Articles Journal of Public Economics Year : 2010

The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors

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Abstract

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives and also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare.

Dates and versions

halshs-00754410 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

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Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet. The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors. Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94 (11-12), pp.1008-1019. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.005⟩. ⟨halshs-00754410⟩
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