Education and social mobility - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles International Tax and Public Finance Year : 2010

Education and social mobility

(1, 2, 3, 4) , (1, 2, 3) , (5, 6, 7, 8)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Abstract

This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degrees of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.

Dates and versions

halshs-00754431 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

Identifiers

Cite

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe de Donder, Pierre Pestieau. Education and social mobility. International Tax and Public Finance, 2010, 17 (4), pp.357-377. ⟨10.1007/s10797-010-9133-0⟩. ⟨halshs-00754431⟩
372 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More