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Endogenous preferences in games with Type-Indeterminate Players

Abstract : The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.
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Déposant : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : vendredi 29 mai 2020 - 23:07:19
Dernière modification le : mardi 19 janvier 2021 - 11:08:58


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  • HAL Id : halshs-00754695, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 316548


Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky. Endogenous preferences in games with Type-Indeterminate Players. AAAI Press Menlo Park, 2010, pp.70-77. ⟨halshs-00754695⟩



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