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Conference papers

Possibilistic games with incomplete information

Abstract : Bayesian games offer a suitable framework for cardinal games, where the utility degrees are additive in essence. This approach does nevertheless not apply to ordinal games, where the utility degrees do not capture more than a ranking, nor to situations of decision under qualitative uncertainty. The present paper proposes a model of (ordinal) games under possibilistic incomplete information (II-games). It extends two fundamental notions of game theory, namely the concepts of pure Nash equilibrium and secure strategy. It finally proposes a transformation that maps any Π-game to a classical normal form game equivalent in terms of Nash equilibrium.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, June 2, 2020 - 12:53:25 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 3, 2021 - 7:15:30 AM


  • HAL Id : hal-02733669, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 474613


Régis Sabbadin, Nahla Ben Amor, Hélène Fargier, Meriem Trabelsi. Possibilistic games with incomplete information. 27èmes Rencontres Francophones sur la Logique Floue et ses Applications (LFA 2018), LGI2A : Laboratoire de Génie Informatique et d’Automatique de l’Artois; AFIA : Association française pour l'intelligence artificielle, Nov 2018, Arras, France. Représentation possibilistes. ⟨hal-02733669⟩



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