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Multi-unit auctions and competition structure

Abstract : Is it better for a seller who wants to auction multiple units to face many small bidders or few large bidders? Since multi-unit auction models usually have many equilibria, there are no theoretical predictions on the impact of the competition structure on the performance of a multi-unit auction (in terms of expected revenue and allocation efficiency). Our experimental results with uniform-price auctions support that with a constant degree of rationing, when the number of bidders increases while individual demand decreases, there is less strategic bidding (demand reduction). It leads to higher expected revenue with a lower variance but allocation efficiency is not significantly different
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  • HAL Id : hal-02821034, version 1
  • PRODINRA : 29255

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Raphaële Préget, Sophie Thoyer. Multi-unit auctions and competition structure. Workshop on behavioral game theory, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Jul 2009, Stony Brook, United States. 26 p. ⟨hal-02821034⟩

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