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Pré-publication, Document de travail

Goal-oriented agents in a market

Abstract : We consider a market where \standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goalorented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payo (the \trigger") to ful ll a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments..
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Pré-publication, Document de travail
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https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02901398
Déposant : Laurent Garnier <>
Soumis le : vendredi 17 juillet 2020 - 10:33:16
Dernière modification le : mercredi 22 juillet 2020 - 10:01:52

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WP 2020-12.pdf
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  • HAL Id : hal-02901398, version 1

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Ines Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou. Goal-oriented agents in a market. 2020. ⟨hal-02901398⟩

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