Goal-oriented agents in a market - INRAE - Institut national de recherche pour l’agriculture, l’alimentation et l’environnement Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2020

Goal-oriented agents in a market

Résumé

We consider a market where \standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goalorented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payo (the \trigger") to ful ll a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments..
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
WP 2020-12.pdf (1.28 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-02901398 , version 1 (17-07-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02901398 , version 1

Citer

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou. Goal-oriented agents in a market. 2020. ⟨hal-02901398⟩
73 Consultations
91 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More