Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Pro-social Motivations, Externalities and Incentives *

Abstract : This paper analyzes how pro-social motivations shape the relationship between incentives and inequality. I consider a principal who offers individual rewards to a group of agents to induce them to exert effort and to coordinate at least-cost. The agents value the payoffs of the other agents, and they are averse to inequality. My analysis highlights that pro-social motivations have an a priori ambiguous effect on inequality in the reward distribution. Despite this initial ambiguity, I show that the rewards are more unequal and lower when the agents have pro-social preferences. The model delivers empirical implications for intervention programs supporting the adoption of new health or agricultural technologies.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Laurent Garnier <>
Submitted on : Friday, April 30, 2021 - 9:09:05 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 1, 2021 - 2:40:29 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, July 31, 2021 - 6:16:59 PM


WP 2021-06.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License


  • HAL Id : hal-03212888, version 1


Raphael Soubeyran. Pro-social Motivations, Externalities and Incentives *. 2021. ⟨hal-03212888v1⟩



Record views