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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Psychology Année : 2021

Goal-oriented agents in a market

Résumé

We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goaloriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.
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Dates et versions

hal-03214933 , version 1 (03-05-2021)

Identifiants

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Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou. Goal-oriented agents in a market. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2021, 84, pp.102378. ⟨10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378⟩. ⟨hal-03214933⟩
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