Veto power and coalition formation in the commons: an experiment - INRAE - Institut national de recherche pour l’agriculture, l’alimentation et l’environnement Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2021

Veto power and coalition formation in the commons: an experiment

Résumé

We propose a five-player common-pool resource (CPR) game with endogenous coalition formation. We show that the level of extraction from the CPR depends on the size of each coalition that is formed and on the final coalition structure. These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment. We consider two treatments: dictator vs. veto. In the dictator treatment, at each stage of the coalition formation game, a randomly chosen player imposes the coalition size and selected members cannot refuse to become a member. In the veto treatment, players have the right to refuse joining the current coalition if they want to and make counter-proposals. We observe that the formation of the grand coalition is more frequent in the dictator treatment. However, with the repetition of the coalition formation game, the grand coalition becomes more frequent under both treatment, and past experience of a grand coalition increases the likelihood that the current coalition structure is the grand coalition. Finally, the possibility to form coalitions is beneficial at reducing CPR extractions, compared to the singleton structure, in both treatments.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
WP 2021-09.pdf (1.98 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03227335 , version 1 (17-05-2021)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03227335 , version 1

Citer

Marc Willinger, Oussama Rhouma, Klarizze Anne Puzon. Veto power and coalition formation in the commons: an experiment. 2021. ⟨hal-03227335⟩
151 Consultations
151 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More