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Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility

Abstract : We analyze a dynamic environmental agreement between two regions. We assume that the agreement is jointly protable, because the eort associated with emission reductions is overcompensated by a cleaner environment in the future The two regions are asymmetric in two respects: their value of a cleaner environment is dierent, and they are responsible for the initial environmental problem in dierent ways. Because the benets of a cleaner environment cannot be transferred, we propose a mechanism on how to share the eorts of lowering current emissions, satisfying two main properties. The rst property is a benets pay principle: the greater one region's relative benet from cooperation, the greater must be its relative contribution. The second property is, a polluter pay principle: a region's relative contribution increases with its responsibility. Moreover, the sharing scheme must be time consistent. At any intermediate time, no country can do better by deviating from cooperation.*
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https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03276451
Contributor : Laurent Garnier <>
Submitted on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 10:20:15 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 7, 2021 - 3:36:12 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-03276451, version 1

Citation

Francisco Cabo, Mabel Tidball. Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility. Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer Verlag, In press. ⟨hal-03276451⟩

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