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An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option

Abstract : This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants’ behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place.
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Contributor : Laurent Garnier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, November 8, 2021 - 10:52:09 AM
Last modification on : Friday, May 20, 2022 - 9:04:17 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, February 9, 2022 - 7:46:36 PM


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Koffi Serge William Yao. An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option. Games, MDPI, 2021, 12 (4), ⟨10.3390/g12040083⟩. ⟨hal-03418905⟩



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