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Pro-social Motivations, Externalities and Incentives

Abstract : This paper analyzes how pro-social motivations shape the relationship between incentives and inequality. I consider a principal who offers individual rewards to a group of agents to induce them to exert effort and to coordinate at least-cost. The agents value the payoffs of the other agents, and they are averse to inequality. My analysis highlights that pro-social motivations have an a priori ambiguous effect on inequality in the reward distribution. Despite this initial ambiguity, I show that the rewards are more unequal and lower when the agents have pro-social preferences. The model delivers empirical implications for intervention programs supporting the adoption of new health or agricultural technologies.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Contributor : Pascal Lallemant <>
Submitted on : Friday, April 30, 2021 - 3:30:43 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 1, 2021 - 2:40:48 PM


2021_Raphael Soubeyran.pdf
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  • HAL Id : hal-03212888, version 2


Raphael Soubeyran. Pro-social Motivations, Externalities and Incentives. 2021. ⟨hal-03212888v2⟩



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