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Journal Articles (Review Article) Games and Economic Behavior Year : 2021

Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

Abstract

We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public good, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another, or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely are group members altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution.
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hal-03181458 , version 1 (24-04-2023)

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Guillaume Cheikbossian. Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 127, pp.206-226. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003⟩. ⟨hal-03181458⟩
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